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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
MARCUS P. RANDOLPH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MARY E. RANDOLPH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff/Appellee's Statement of Facts contain errors, 
mis-statements and is principally a summation of his own testimony 
that was disputed and/or contradicted by Defendant/Appellant's 
testimony and evidence. 
There is no set formula for the division of assets or debts. 
In the exercise of its discretionary authority, the trial Court is 
not required to divide marital assets or debts equally and may make 
such orders concerning property distribution and debts as are 
equitable. 
Plaintiff/Appellee's contention that the Order that required 
him to pay 1/2 of the cost of private school for the two (2) minor 
children, in addition to child support was abuse of discretion is 
1 
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without merit where he essentially agreed to private schooling and 
to pay the cost. 
The question of maintaining life insurance coverage lies 
within the sound discretion of the trial Court. The Order that 
Plaintiff/Appellee continue to maintain his present policy of life 
insurance for the protection and benefit of Defendant/Appellant, 
wife and children, was not abuse of discretion where the combined 
ordered child support and alimony obligation would exceed 
$222,000.00. 
The denial of Plaintiff/Appellee's post trial Motion to set 
aside the Stipulation to custody was proper where a material change 
of circumstances had not occurred and the Motion failed to meet 
the Hogge test. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACT CONTAINED ERRORS. 
MIS-STATEMENTS AND IS PRINCIPALLY A SUMMATION OF HIS OWN 
TESTIMONY THAT WAS DISPUTED AND/OR CONTRADICTED BY DEFENDANT/ 
APPELLANT'S TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE. 
1. Plaintiff/Appellee testified that he received, in addition 
to his base salary from Kennecott, an annual "performance bonus." 
His use of the term "commissions" is misleading and incorrect. 
(T. 14-15). 
2. The statement that Plaintiff/Appellee's income, at the 
time of trial was $114,500.00 annually, which included a 
2 
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substantial bonus ($26,000.00) is true and correct. The bonus 
amount set forth in the Statement of Facts of $14,500.00 is not 
correct. The bonus amount was $26,000.00 and the net amount was 
approximately $16,900.00. (T. 14) Plaintiff's base annual salary 
of $88,500.00 ($ 7,375.00 per month) with the $26,000.00 bonus made 
his total income, at the time of trial, $114,500.00 annually 
($9,542.00 per month), for the purpose of determining the child 
support obligation of $1,3 61.00 per month, in compliance with the 
statutory Guidelines. The determination and the amount of the 
support was not disputed. (T. 22) The $26,000.00 bonus he 
received prior to trial was $6,000.00 more than the $20,000.00 
bonus he received in 1991. (T. 14). 
3. Plaintiff/Appellee's statement, "Defendant worked 
different jobs during the marriage" is misleading and contrary to 
the testimony of Defendant/Appellant. She testified, without 
contradiction, she worked the first two (2) years of the marriage. 
That she had not worked since 1979, other than tending children in 
the home when they lived in Boston and Mr. Randolph attended 
Harvard University to get his Master's Degree during 1988-90. 
(T. 153-154) 
4. The statement of Plaintiff/Appellee that he contested the 
request of Defendant/Appellant that he pay 1/2 of the children's 
private school cost is not supported by the record. Plaintiff 
stated, in response to a question from his counsel, "he believed 
that the child support award of $1,361.00 would be adequate to meet 
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the needs of the children, including private school.11 (T. 22-23) 
Plaintiff/Appellee did not dispute or contradict the statement of 
Defendant/Appellant that he agreed to private schooling for the 
minor children, that the cost was approximately $1,700.00 per year 
(not including summer camp) and the understanding was he would 
share in the cost of the children's private schooling. (T. 138; 140) 
5. The statement of Plaintiff/Appellee that he proposed to 
pay alimony to Defendant of $1,100.00 per month is basically 
correct and disputed. However, it is important to point out that 
the "Troy receivable11 was a joint marital asset which the Defendant 
held a 1/2 interest. The inference and innuendo is that Plaintiff 
is treating the "Troy receivable" as his sole asset in his proposal 
to award it to Defendant in lieu of additional alimony. 
6. Plaintiff/Appellee's statement that the ready access loan 
and tax liability were marital debts is disputed by the record. He 
acknowledges the ready access loan was taken out by him solely 
after separation (T. 32) ; had essentially closed the parties joint 
bank accounts or removed all of the funds from the joint accounts 
and placed them in accounts solely in his name; (T. 122-127) had at 
his disposal $48,000.00 before taxes (T. 119-120) paying only 
$500.00 to the Defendant, which he claimed to be alimony for July, 
1991 (T. 127) ; leaving Defendant and the minor children without 
adequate finances and in near destitute circumstances, in contrast 
to the past practice of providing $1,500.00 to $2,000.00 per month 
to Defendant for household expenses. (T. 172) 
4 
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7. The statement in Plaintiff/Appellee's Statement of Facts 
that Defendant testified she used $1,500.00 of joint funds for her 
initial attorney's fees and costs is true and not disputed. 
Plaintiff neglects to set forth and state that he paid more than 
$1,700.00 as attorney's fees and costs to his first attorney, Mr. 
Hettinger, from the parties joint funds that he had removed from 
their joint money market account. (T. 129-30) 
II. 
THERE IS NO SET FORMULA FOR THE DIVISION OF ASSETS OR 
DEBTS. IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY, 
THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT REQUIRED TO DIVIDE MARITAL ASSETS OR 
DEBTS EQUALLY AND MAY MAKE SUCH ORDERS CONCERNING PROPERTY 
DISTRIBUTION AND DEBTS AS ARE EQUITABLE. 
1. In dividing a marital estate, the trial Court is empowered 
to enter equitable orders concerning property distribution, as well 
as debts and obligations. 30-3-5(1)(c) U.C.A. The Court is 
permitted considerable discretion in making such orders, which will 
not be disturbed unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of 
discretion. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1313 (Ut. C.A. 88) 
There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of 
properties in a divorce action. Watson v. Watson, 837 P. 2d 1 (Ut. 
C.A. 92); Naranio v. Naranio. 751 P.2d 1144 (Ut. C.A. 88) 
Plaintiff/Appellee's argument that property should be divided 
"equally" is not supported by law or the facts and circumstances 
5 
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present in this case. 
2. Plaintiff/Appellee, in his argument, did not mention the 
fact he retained a 1972 Porsche 911 that he reportedly sold for 
$8,400.00. He retained all of these proceeds as his separate 
property and used them to purchase the 1992 Ford Explorer, listing 
the loan he obtained as one of his debts. (Plaintiff's Addendum F) 
The sale of the Porsche and purchase of the Ford Explorer occurred 
after separation, during the pendency of the action. Plaintiff 
sought and obtained an Order that he be authorized to sell the 
Porsche, as well as the marital residence. (R. 50-51; 71-76) 
After the marital residence was sold and the proceeds divided 
pursuant to the earlier order of the Court, Defendant did not pay 
off the Ford Explorer loan, using the loan as a deduction against 
income. (Exhibit P-7, Addendum F) As a side note, it should be 
pointed out that the calculations on Plaintiff's Exhibit P-7, 
Addendum F, contain errors with estimated and unverified deductions 
for taxes. Plaintiff deducted as an expense against gross income 
his personal tax exemption. The personal tax exemption is not a 
payment but a tax credit against income for the purpose of 
determining tax liability. This error, coupled with estimated 
unverified tax liability, without considering the Court awarded 
Plaintiff the two (2) minor children as additional tax exemptions, 
results in Plaintiff's claimed "actual monthly income11 to be 
substantially understated. 
3. Plaintiff, in his argument, did not mention the fact that 
6 
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the original ready-credit loan account had been paid off in full. 
That the ready-credit debt was incurred solely by him after 
separation. He played a "shell game" with the parties joint funds 
that he removed from joint accounts approximating $11,900.00, and 
deposited into various new accounts in his name solely. That he 
retained for his own use funds in excess of $8,000.00. (T. 123-
126) That he paid temporary alimony to Defendant out of the joint 
funds transferred from the parties joint money market account. 
(T. 127) Defendant only received $2,000.00 of the joint money 
market funds, which he deposited in her checking account that he 
sometimes wrote checks against. (T. 123-127) Plaintiff 
deliberately had the bank statements sent to his work address" so 
the Defendant would not have knowledge of these financial dealings. 
Although Plaintiff stated it was his intent to equalize the funds 
he took control of, it didn't happen. (T. 128) 
4. Plaintiff does not mention in his Argument that he 
retained the entire amount of the bonus he received in 1992 as a 
performance bonus for 1991 in the net amount of approximately 
$16,900.00. Also, that he had at his disposal in the first three 
(3) months of 1992, net income of $32,000.00, more than enough to 
meet his expenses and pay off in full the ready-access debt, as 
well as the tax liability he claimed. The trial Court was well 
within its discretionary authority to consider these facts in 
rendering its decision. 
5. Plaintiff proposed that Defendant be awarded the "Troy 
7 
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receivable," a jointly owned asset, to in effect reduce his 
alimony obligation to Defendant. He now advances the argument, 
because the Court did what he asked, but awarded $1,500.00 alimony 
to Defendant, this was an unequal division of marital property and 
the Court abused its discretion. This argument is inconsistent 
and should be disregarded. Plaintiff does not claim the division 
of property was "inequitable or that it was not fairly divided" 
only that it is not "equal." Under the law and the circumstances 
at the time of the divorce, Plaintiff's argument fails to meet his 
burden that the division of property and the order he pay the post 
separation debts is so inequitable, to be clearly unjust, and a 
clear abuse of discretion. Rasband v. Rasband, supra. 
6. Plaintiff points out that the Court must issue sufficient 
findings to demonstrate an award of property other than equal. 
This issue was addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in Jones v. 
Jones. 700 P. 2d 1072 at Page 1074. Plaintiff, Mr. Randolph, as in 
the Jones case, prepared the Findings of Fact and claims that there 
has been an unequal division of property. The Utah Supreme Court, 
on this issue, stated: 
Normally, we would grant the remedy sought by the 
wife and remand for findings on the specific value 
of assets. In this case, however, the wife's 
attorney prepared the inadequate Findings of Fact, 
she challenges on appeal, and the Conclusions of Law 
and Decree of Divorce, all of which the Court 
entered without alteration. Counsel for the wife 
made no motion to have the trial Court amend the 
Findings to include values. (See Ut. R. CIV. P. 
52(b) The wife cannot come now, . . . . and 
complain of her own failure to include specific 
8 
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property values in the Findings of Fact. 
In order to challenge the trial Court's Findings of Fact, Plaintiff 
as Cross-Appellant, must first marshall the evidence which supports 
the Findings and then demonstrate that, despite this evidence, it 
is clearly erroneous. Plaintiff has not met his burden of 
overriding the presumption of the validity of the Court's Order 
distributing property and ordering Defendant to pay the post 
separation debts. 
Ill 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE'S CONTENTION THAT THE ORDER THAT 
REQUIRED HIM TO PAY 1/2 OF THE COST OF PRIVATE SCHOOL 
FOR THE TWO (2) MINOR CHILDREN, IN ADDITION TO CHILD 
SUPPORT WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION IS WITHOUT MERIT WHERE HE 
ESSENTIALLY AGREED TO PRIVATE SCHOOLING AND TO PAY THE COST. 
1. Mr. Randolph, during the marriage, before separation and 
after separation, agreed with Mrs. Randolph that the children 
attend private school. He agreed to share the cost after 
separation to the time of trial. The worksheet he presented at 
trial, of Defendant's living expenses, to demonstrate, in his 
opinion, that the base support required under the Guidelines was 
sufficient to cover the expense of private school, is flawed. 
Addendum I (Exhibit P-6) did not include the cost for summer camp 
or uniforms for the girls. He estimated college expenses for Mrs. 
Randolph to be $177.00 per month, dividing the quarterly expenses 
of $707.00 by four (4) months. Quarterly expenses should be 
9 
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divided by three (3) months and in fact exceeded $2 3 6.00 per month. 
Mr. Randolph only provided for eight (8) months of child care (3 
quarters) rather than a full year, although Mrs. Randolph testified 
that she would attend college during the summers to meet her 
anticipated graduation where she was carrying less than 12 hours 
per quarter. 
2. Plaintiff's argument that school expenses should be 
considered part of the base support amount calculated under the 
Guidelines is not supported. Review of Section 78-45-2 
(Definitions) and 78-45-7.14 (Base Support) does not indicate that 
the cost of private school is included in the base support table. 
The Uniform Support Act does state that the base support table is 
adjusted for taxes and the claiming of tax exemptions. The Court 
awarded Plaintiff the tax exemptions for both children without a 
corresponding increase in the base support amount without 
considering the higher tax liability resulting to Mrs. Randolph. 
Given the fact that the cost of private schooling is not included 
in the base support table under the Uniform Guidelines, there is no 
maximum limit on the base child support award that may be ordered, 
except where it would exceed 50% of the obligor's adjusted income, 
Plaintiff's argument on this issue must fail. (See 78-45-7.18 
U.C.A.) The Order that Plaintiff pay 1/2 of the cost of private 
schooling for the minor children, in addition to base child 
support, does not exceed the 50% limitation, is not a deviation or 
rebuttal of the Guidelines requiring specific findings by the 
10 
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Court. It should be pointed out that child care expenses and 
uninsured medical and dental expenses are not included in the base 
child support tables. (78-45-7.15 and 7.16 U.C.A.) Therefore, it 
is reasonable to conclude that cost of private schooling is a 
separate issue to be determined by the trial Court. The Order that 
Plaintiff continue to share the cost of private schooling was not 
abuse of discretion under the facts and circumstances. 
IV 
THE QUESTION OF MAINTAINING LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE LIES 
WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. THE ORDER 
THAT PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN HIS PRESENT 
POLICY OF LIFE INSURANCE FOR THE PROTECTION AND BENEFIT OF 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, WIFE AND CHILDREN, WAS NOT ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION WHERE THE COMBINED ORDERED CHILD SUPPORT AND 
ALIMONY OBLIGATION WOULD EXCEED $222,000.00 . 
1. Plaintiff does not claim he has been prejudiced in any 
manner by the trial Court's Order that he continue to maintain in 
force 1/2 of his present life insurance through his employment at 
Kennecott for the benefit of Plaintiff until termination of 
alimony. In fact, the premium cost for his $200,000.00 term life 
policy is $15.93 per month, which is deemed nominal. (Exhibit P-3) 
The fact Plaintiff had the policy in force at the time of trial is 
deemed a sufficient basis for the Court's Order. Given the 
additional facts that there are substantial bond funds ordered to 
be held for the children's post high school education, and that 
Defendant has an incurable disease, as stated by Plaintiff, 
11 
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(T. 9) it is highly conceivable that alimony may be extended beyond 
the time period ordered by the Court, should there be a substantial 
change in Defendant's circumstances. 
2. The combined ordered obligation of alimony and child 
support exceeds $220,000.00. The amount of insurance ordered to 
be carried by Plaintiff for the benefit of both Defendant and the 
two (2) minor children, is $200,000.00, (FOF Index 251-252) 
$22,000.00 less than the combined total. Absent a clear showing 
of abuse of discretion, it was not error for the Court to divide 
Defendant's present life insurance coverage between the minor 
children and Defendant, in view of the bond funds held for the 
benefit of the children. The Order of the trial Court should not 
be disturbed. The requirement that Plaintiff maintain part of his 
life insurance coverage for the benefit of the Defendant, wife, 
until alimony terminates, is a proper exercise of the trial Court's 
discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the 
parties. 
IV 
A DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE'S POST TRIAL MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE THE STIPULATION TO CUSTODY WAS PROPER WHERE A 
MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES HAD NOT OCCURRED AND THE 
MOTION FAILED TO MEET THE HOGGE TEST. 
1. Plaintiff was provided ample opportunity to pursue the 
issue of custody during the entire pendency of the divorce action. 
At various times he used the threat of pursuing custody to harass 
12 
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Defendant and in an effort to enhance his bargaining position• 
After the initial hearing on the Temporary Order for Relief, which 
awarded temporary custody to Defendant, to the time of the October 
Pre-trial Conference, Plaintiff did very little to pursue the 
custody issue. Upon Plaintiff's representation that he was going 
to actively pursue the custody issue, the October, 1991 Pre-trial 
Settlement Conference was continued, without date, to allow him to 
obtain a custody evaluation. (R. 125) Plaintiff changed 
attorney1s and without pursuing the requested custody evaluation, 
notified the Domestic Relations Commissioner, Michael Evans, that 
he no longer was seeking custody of the two (2) minor children, did 
not intend to pursue the custody evaluation as previously ordered, 
and requested that the case be certified to the Court for trial. 
(R. 126-128) The case was certified for trial by written Minute 
Entry, November 21, 1991. The case was set for trial February 18, 
1992, at which time Plaintiff obtained a bifurcated Decree of 
Divorce. He then hastily remarried. Trial of the financial and 
property issues was held March 24, 1992, giving Plaintiff more than 
adequate time to pursue the custody issue if he truly desired. 
2. The Motion of Plaintiff to withdraw his Stipulation to 
Custody did not meet the required test of Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P. 2d 
51 (Ut. 1982) clarified by Becker v. Becker, 694 P. 2d 608 (Ut. 
1984), to-wit: 
The party seeking custody must prove that there has 
been a change in the circumstances upon which the 
previous custody award was based, which substantially 
13 
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and materially affects the custodial parent's parenting 
ability or the functioning of the custodial relationship. 
Plaintiff claims, in his Motion, that he entered into the 
Stipulation to Custody upon a faulty premise. The matters set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 4 of his Motion relate to 
circumstances which existed prior to filing the divorce Complaint, 
and the trial of March, 1992. The claimed faulty premise was 
Plaintiff's not the Defendant's or the trial Court. The 
statements, claims and allegations of Plaintiff set forth in 
paragraphs 5 through 10 of his Motion deal with claimed insulting 
and demeaning messages alleged to have been left on Plaintiff's 
answering machine by Defendant, directed at Plaintiff and his new 
wife, together with unsubstantiated and unsupported claims relating 
to problems with visitation. Defendant's Verified Reply to 
Plaintiff's Motion contested and thoroughly refuted the claims of 
Plaintiff. It is apparent that the trial Court, after review of 
Plaintiff's Motion, Defendant's Verified Reply thereto and the 
history of this case, concluded that under the Hogge and Becker 
standard, there was no showing of a change in circumstances 
materially affecting Defendant's ability or fitness, as the 
custodial parent, to care for the children. That any claimed 
changes in the circumstances of Plaintiff as the noncustodial 
parent, to-wit: his remarriage and relationship with his new wife, 
were irrelevant. There being no showing of a material change of 
circumstances affecting Defendant's ability or fitness to care for 
14 
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the children as the custodial parent, the denial of Plaintiff's 
Motion by the trial Court was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
The relief sought by Plaintiff on his Cross-Appeal should be 
denied. The arbitrary reduction of alimony awarded Defendant 
(wife) and automatic termination after four (4) years, being 
contrary to law, should be reversed and Defendant awarded permanent 
alimony under the circumstances established by the evidence. 
The award of alimony to Defendant should be increased to an 
amount sufficient to meet the reasonable and necessary needs of 
Defendant, under the financial circumstances established by the 
evidence, so as to equalize the parties post divorce standard of 
living as near as possible to that enjoyed by the parties prior to 
the divorce. 
The award of attorney's fees to Defendant should be increased 
to $2,800.00 and she awarded attorney's fees on this Appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this / //~day of June, 1993. 
15 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed 
to Kellie F. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee, 310 South 
Main Street, Suite 1400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this / *-
day of June, 1993. 
urn//?//j^~> 
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•J I O » " •- v/ J -J i\ ' 
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Bar No* 1032 
Attorney for Defendant 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-1148 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARCUS P. RANDOLPH, 
* DEFENDANT'S VERIFIED REPLY TO 
Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
* STIPULATION 
vs. 
* Civil No. 914902308 DA 
MARY E. RANDOLPH, 
* Judge Sawaya 
Defendant. 
Defendant, Mary Randolph, by and through her attorney of 
record, E. H. Fankhauser, pursuant to Rules 6.401 and 4.501(b), 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, submits the following 
Verified Reply and Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Withdraw 
Stipulation regarding the issue of custody. 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
Plaintiff has failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 6-
401(1), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, which requires all 
domestic relation matters filed in the District Courts, in Counties 
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where Commissioners are appointed and serving, to be referred to 
the Commissioner, upon filing with the Clerk of the Court unless 
otherwise ordered by the presiding Judge of the District. 
Plaintiff has not sought or obtained an order from the presiding 
Judge which would authorize the Plaintiff to bring this Motion 
directly before the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. The Motion of Plaintiff is improperly 
before the Court and should be dismissed and denied. 
VERIFIED REPLY TO MOTION 
1. In the event the Court should authorize Plaintiff's Motion 
to be brought and determined pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, his statement as to filing a Complaint, 
requesting award of custody, the birthdates of the two (2) minor 
children and that the Plaintiff wilfully withdrew his request for 
custody of the children is basically true and correct. The 
reason(s) Plaintiff claims that he withdrew his request for the 
award of custody is disputed and denied by the Defendant on the 
basis that the same is deemed to be a misrepresentation on the part 
of Plaintiff and without merit. 
2. The statements of Plaintiff regarding Defendant's illness 
in paragraph 2 of his Verified Motion is a situation and fact that 
was well known to Plaintiff, both prior to the filing of his 
Complaint for divorce seeking custody, the hearing on the Temporary 
Order which awarded temporary custody to the Defendant during the 
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pendency of the action. Plaintiff relied upon Defendant's illness 
as the basis for him being awarded temporary custody which was 
rejected and denied by the Domestic Relations Commissioner. 
Plaintiff, at the Pre-trial Settlement Conference, voluntarily 
withdrew his quest for custody, without any representations made on 
the part of Defendant or his reliance on such. Defendant takes 
issue with Plaintiff's categorization of her illness as being an 
incurable mental illness due to the fact that it is diagnosed as a 
bi-polar disorder, directly associated with a chemical imbalance. 
That her condition is controlled and treated with Lithium Carbonate 
is not disputed. The mere fact that Lithium is prescribed and 
Defendant takes Lithium on a regular basis does not mean another 
episode will occur. There is no medical basis for that statement 
by Plaintiff. 
3. During Defendant's first manic episode, which began in 
January, 1990, she continued caring for the family and the minor 
children. She was attending school, taking night courses, in 
addition to providing day care for five (5) other children during 
the day time hours from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. without any 
assistance or help from Plaintiff, who failed to notice Defendant 
was experiencing any problem. Defendant continued working and 
providing day care service up to the day before she entered the 
hospital. One of the day care mothers, who is a registered 
psychiatric nurse practitioner, observed Defendant's condition of 
fatigue, brought on by lack of sleep, weight loss and the inability 
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to concentrate. She called the Plaintiff, requesting that he do 
something to assist Defendant in that she was concerned about 
Defendant's welfare. Plaintifffs claim that Defendant became 
deeply religious and ignored the children and her family 
responsibility is denied to the extent that Defendant continued to 
perform up to the time that her condition was brought to the 
attention of Plaintiff and she was required to be hospitalized for 
medical treatment. 
One month prior to the first manic episode, the Plaintiff, Mr. 
Randolph, lost his temper during an argument and physically abused 
Defendant by throwing her from room to room and into furniture, 
walls and finally on to the floor, while the children watched in 
horror, crying and protesting. This incident contributed to 
Defendant's manic episode, according to Defendant's physicians and 
researchers at McLeans Hospital in Massachusetts. 
4. Plaintiff's claim that the second manic episode occurred 
in February, 1991 is true. The statement that it was because 
Defendant was experimenting with a reduced drug dosage of Lithium 
is denied on the basis that it is a misrepresentation of the true 
facts. Defendant previously filed an Affidavit with the Court in 
connection with the hearing for temporary custody, detailing the 
situation which occurred in February, 1991. Defendant requests the 
Court to review the Affidavit. Defendant states that she did not 
begin "experimenting with Lithium." Defendant's psychiatrist felt 
that her condition had improved substantially and that all had gone 
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well for approximate one (1) yearf rendering it possible to reduce 
the dosage gradually in increments from 900 mg. to 450 mg. At the 
level of 450 mg., Defendant began to experience symptoms similar to 
those of the previous year. During this exact time Defendant 
decided to divorce Plaintiff and packed bags for herself and the 
children, intending to drive to Denver, at which time she would 
notify her family of her decision to divorce Plaintiff. Defendant 
did not tell Plaintiff that she was going to divorce him, due to 
the fact she was afraid of his rages of anger and that the 
Plaintiff would harm her physically, as well as the children. 
Defendant did go to Denver as planned and it was during this time 
that she began to suffer the second manic episode. 
Plaintiff's claim that Defendant skipped psychiatric 
counseling during this period is denied. The fact is Defendant did 
not skip psychiatric counseling during this period and her doctor 
was monitoring her closely because of the changes in dosage, until 
Defendant drove to Denver with the children in anticipation of 
filing divorce against Plaintiff. Defendant missed one (1) 
appointment and that was the day she left for Denver. Defendant 
did not stop taking her medication, Synthroid, until she entered 
Western Institute of Neuropsychology. The staff at Western 
Institute did not provide or offer the medication to Defendant. 
Defendant's sister, who was pregnant, is a psychiatric nurse, 
employed at a drug and rehab hospital in Denver. Defendant's 
sister contacted Defendant's psychiatrist in Salt Lake City, Dr. 
5 
00017b 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Joe. Culbertson, and told him that Defendant's behavior seemed 
normal but the unexpected trip concerned her and discussed with Dr. 
Culbertson the feasibility of hospitalizing Defendant for Lithium 
stabilization in Denver or Salt Lake City. 
At the time Defendant returned to Salt Lake City, Plaintiff 
began making dinner, turkey meatloaf in a heart shaped pan and 
became very demanding and adamant that their 4 year old daughter, 
who had snacked most of the way back from Denver, be forced to eat 
it. The child was crying and Defendant tried to intercede and 
requested that the Plaintiff not force the child to eat food when 
she was not hungry. Plaintiff flexed his arm muscles and made 
growling noises, causing Defendant to be fearful for her safety and 
the safety of the youngest daughter. Defendant sought shelter at 
the Catholic Church until the coordinator from Mar iliac House (this 
woman also spent three months living in our basement) could come 
and pick Defendant up. Their records will show Defendant spent one 
(1) night there because the following day Defendant notified her 
psychiatrist, Dr. Culbertson, that she was in town, made an 
appointment with him. She kept the appointment and at that time 
Dr. Culbertson decided that Defendant should check into Western 
Institute. Defendant agreed to follow the advise of her doctor and 
go to Western Institute because she felt it was safer than her own 
home. The statement of Plaintiff that Defendant refused to be 
admitted to hospitalization is not true in that Defendant was 
referred to Western Institute by her doctor. 
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To the best of Defendant's knowledge, she did not physically 
attack anyone. Defendant does recall that staff members and her 
doctor assisted her into intensive care. Defendant denies the 
allegations of Plaintiff that she lit the garbage can on fire. 
However, there was an argument between Defendant and a staff member 
because Defendant put her cigarette out in the trash can instead of 
an ashtray. 
Defendant was placed in isolation by her own choice. The 
staff personnel never used physical restraints on Defendant, in 
isolation or any other time. Defendant spent approximately two (2) 
weeks at Western Institute and two (2) weeks at the University 
Hospital 
5. The statements contained in paragraph 3 of Defendant's 
Motion regarding the bifurcation of the divorce proceedings on 
February 28, 1992 and that the property matters proceeded to trial 
on March 24, 1992 is basically true. What Plaintiff did or not do 
regarding introducing the children to his present wife is unknown 
to Defendant and therefore denied. Defendant can state that she 
became aware of the Plaintiff's relationship with the other woman 
after he had filed divorce and before the granting of the Decree of 
Divorce, February 18, 1992. 
6. Defendant cannot admit or deny Plaintiff's claim regarding 
concern set forth in paragraph 4 of his Motion but can only state 
that any express concerns regarding Defendant's mental health and 
her willingness to permit Plaintiff access and visitation with the 
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children is without basis or merit. Here again, the Plaintiff 
voluntarily, without any representations or promises on the part of 
Defendant, willingly abandoned his claim for custody and joint 
custody of the children. That it is the understanding and belief 
of Defendant that Plaintiff did so primarily for financial reasons 
and the fact that the Domestic Relations Commissioner had 
previously rejected his request for the award of temporary custody 
essentially on the same basis that he is now seeking to withdraw 
his Stipulation, to-wit: the illness of Defendant. Immediately 
after Defendant's release from the hospital in February, 1991, she 
returned to the marital home and resumed her duties and 
responsibilities of caring for the children, full time, as well as 
the home, with very little, if any, assistance from the Plaintiff. 
Further, Plaintiff did not provide her with a housekeeper or 
someone to assist her in caring for the children or the home in 
that it was not needed and the circumstances which existed then 
remain the same now. 
6. In response to the statements and allegations of the 
Plaintiff in paragraph 5 of his Motion, Defendant states that the 
information contained therein is a distortion and misrepresentation 
of the true facts and is therefore denied on the following basis, 
to-wit: 
(a) The only time that Defendant denied Plaintiff's 
request for visitation was after Defendant had exercised his 
mid-week visitation on a Tuesday. Plaintiff had returned the 
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children and requested that he take the children again on 
Thursday of that week. Defendant refused Plaintiff's request 
for additional mid-week visitation because of their schedule. 
It would throw the children off their schedule and be 
disruptive to them. Plaintiff very often disregards 
the children's schedule and visitation hours. Plaintiff has, 
on many occasions, brought the children home after their 
bed time, thereby affecting their school performance and 
sleep schedule. I agreed that the Plaintiff could have a 
mid-week visit every week instead of every other week, under 
the standard visitation schedule. Plaintiff has received 
every mid-week visit he was scheduled to receive. 
(b) On one occasion in January, Defendant was not home 
because Plaintiff did not tell Defendant he was bringing the 
children back early at 6:00 P.M. as opposed to the scheduled 
visitation that was to terminate at 8:00 P.M. The only 
stress the children experienced was the stress Plaintiff 
imposed on them because he missed a flight to Arizona. 
Plaintiff knew the names of the babysitters Defendant used 
and could have notified one of the babysitters and left the 
children with them until he was to return the children at 
the appointed hour of 8:00 P.M. Plaintiff's claim that 
Defendant fails to have the children ready for him at the 
agreed time is disputed and denied. Plaintiff's claim that 
Defendant failed to be at home when the children were required 
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to be returned is a misrepresentation of the true facts and 
a situation created by Plaintiff's own lack of concern for 
the welfare of the children in failing to notify Defendant 
that he wanted to bring the children home earlier than the 
scheduled time, as stated: 
(c) Plaintiff's claim that Defendant has been verbally 
abusive to the Plaintiff and his wife in the presence of the 
minor children is disputed and denied. Defendant has not 
been verbally abusive to the Plaintiff's wife, Lee, because 
Defendant had not seen or talked with her at any time prior 
to April 24, 1992. Further, the claim of Plaintiff that 
Defendant made a derogatory statement to Plaintiff in front 
of the children, to-wit: "did you know that you had little 
brothers and sisters all over South America?" and the 
companion statement set forth in his Motion is a 
misrepresentation and distortion of the true facts and 
circumstances. On the weekend of March 29, 1992, Plaintiff 
had the children over the weekend for visitation. Defendant 
took advantage of this weekend and went to visit her sister in 
Denver. During this time Defendant told her sister about 
the Plaintiff infecting Defendant with a sexually transmitted 
disease (crabs) in South America (Peru) while Defendant was 
pregnant with the parties youngest child. Plaintiff claimed 
that he had picked up the disease off a towel in a locker 
room. Defendant's sister, who is a nurse, said that this 
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was impossible and that Mary was very naive. When Defendant 
returned to Salt Lake City to pick up the children at the 
end of Plaintiff's weekend visitation, the children were in 
the car and not within hearing of the conversation between 
her and the Plaintiff. Defendant confronted Plaintiff about 
infecting her with the crabs and his apparent lie of how this 
occurred. She asked him if the children had any younger 
brothers and sisters in South America. Plaintiff shook his 
head. Defendant told Plaintiff that the crabs he had infected 
her with were "real comfortable," meaning very painful and 
distressful. As stated, the children were in the car which 
was in the drive-way of the home of Plaintiff's present wife, 
away from the conversation which took place on the porch 
outside of the hearing of the children. Defendant has never 
said anything remotely similar directly or indirectly to the 
children or in their presence. 
During the same weekend that Defendant was visiting with 
her sister in Denver, March 29, 1992, Defendant's sister told 
her about a situation of Plaintiff having an affair with a 
woman from Chile while she (Defendant's sister) her husband 
and Marcus had gone on a trip in Peru. Marcus and the woman 
were blatantly fondling each other on a bus trip when 
Defendant's sister finally told Marcus that what he was doing 
was immoral, disgusting and revolting form of behavior in 
front of his own sister-in-law. 
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When Defendant was informed of Plaintiff's upcoming 
wedding and marriage plans, she called to congratulate him. 
He was not home and Defendant left the following message 
on his answering machine, "I'm glad you found somebody, 
although Roz (the wife of a co-employee of Marcus) says she 
is plain and uncouth, but I'm happy for you." 
Plaintiff's attorney, asked Defendant, while under oath 
during the trial, March 24, 1992, about her making an alleged 
statement about Plaintiff's wife giving him good blow jobs. 
Defendant stated then, under oath, that she had not made such 
a statement and stated, she would never ask Plaintiff if she 
(meaning his wife) gives good blow jobs. The statements 
contained in paragraph 5 (c) of Defendant's Motion is 
denied and is a distortion of the statements made under oath 
by Defendant at trial. 
The statement contained in paragraph 5(c) of 
Plaintiff's Motion regarding a recently left message on 
Plaintiff's telephone answering machine, calling Plaintiff's 
wife plain and uncouth has already been responded to. The 
statement that the children could be heard protesting in the 
background is confusing and disputed. The claim that 
Defendant has left insulting messages on Plaintiff's 
answering machine while the children could be heard protesting 
in the back ground is likewise disputed and denied. Defendant 
can only assume that Plaintiff is referring to the usual 
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background noise of children who are playing and some times 
arguing or acting as children usually do. Defendant often has 
to shut her office door when making phone calls because of the 
noise generated by the children when playing or engaging in 
other activities. Defendant can only assume that Plaintiff is 
referring to one situation over souvenir toiletry bags given 
to the girls during one of Plaintiff's periods of visitation. 
Defendant called the Plaintiff to thank him for the children's 
gifts and in doing so stated that she wanted to thank him 
for the girls toiletry bags, at which time the youngest child 
commented "oh mamma," thinking that she had said toilet as a 
bad word, which was not the case at all. 
(d) The statement that Defendant has taken the minor 
child, Kira, to counseling sessions is true. That these have 
been over Kira's objection is disputed and denied. Defendant 
has taken Kira to counseling because she has been showing 
signs of depression, sadness and confusion related to the 
divorce and her father's recent marriage. The therapist has 
informed Defendant that this is a usual reaction in situations 
where there is divorce and a quick marriage by one spouse. 
Each time that Kira goes to therapy, the therapist states, 
reminds her and reaffirms that she does not have to be in 
therapy or sit through any of the sessions if she does not 
want to. That he does not want her to feel that she is 
being forced to sit through sessions. Kira is beginning to 
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build a rapport with the therapist and it appears that the 
Plaintiff is trying to sabotage Defendant's efforts to deal 
with the child's depression, sadness and confusion brought 
on by the divorce and Plaintiff's recent marriage in that he 
has argued with Defendant over the expense of therapy and has 
told Defendant he does not believe in it. Defendant is of 
the opinion that the concerns of the Plaintiff are more 
financial rather than what is in the best interest of the 
minor child. 
(e) Defendant denies the statements of Plaintiff that 
she threatened to cut off his visitation rights. Defendant 
has never threatened to do so. Defendant told the Plaintiff 
that he should not have the children and could not have the 
children over night when he is in the presence of his 
girlfriend, Lee, to whom he was not married. That she 
deemed this to be immoral and not in the best interest of 
the minor children. Defendant suggested that Plaintiff bring 
the children home Saturday night and then pick them up on 
Sunday mornings if he wanted to spend Saturday nights with his 
girlfriend in her home. His usual weekend visits with the 
children are Saturday at 9:00 A.M. to Sunday, 3:00 P.M. 
Defendant has requested often that Plaintiff take the children 
for a longer period of time to which his response was "these 
are only guidelines - I don't have to take the kids on 
Fridays and later on Sunday, if I don't want to - I have 
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errands to run and things to do." This is clearly an example 
that Plaintiff is more concerned about his own interest, 
rather than the best interest and welfare of the minor 
children. 
(f) The statement of Plaintiff that Defendant would not 
allow visitation if he and his wife discuss visitation or 
custody with the children is a mis-statement of the facts and 
circumstances and therefore denied as untrue. Defendant asked 
Plaintiff (Marcus) and his wife to not discuss custody issues 
with Kira, due to the fact it was confusing and upsetting to 
her. Defendant did state to Plaintiff that if Plaintiff and 
his wife continued to discuss custody issues with Kira, she 
would have to contact her lawyer and request that a 
Restraining Order be issued, restraining the Plaintiff and 
his wife from discussing custody matters and other divorce 
issues with the children. Also, the fact that Plaintiff's 
wife, Lee, had demanded Erika (age 5) to call Lee "mom" which 
confused and traumatized her to the point of tears. 
(g) The statements of Plaintiff in paragraph 5(g) of 
his Motion are disputed and denied. Some time last summer, 
after Defendant had visited her family in Denver, Colorado, 
with the minor children, the subject came up on inquiry of 
the children. The children asked Defendant if she intended 
to move to Colorado. Defendant responded that she 
thought it would be nice after she graduated and had obtained 
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her masters and teaching certificate because jobs for teaching 
in Utah were scarce. Defendant denies that she ever stated 
that she would move to Colorado so that she could have the 
children all to herself. Defendant does not recall the 
subject coming up or being discussed since last summer. 
The fact remains that the children have grandparents and 
many loving aunts, uncles and cousins in Denver which they 
know, love and enjoy visiting.. 
(h) The statements of Plaintiff in subparagraph 5(h) 
of his Motion that Defendant has acted in a manner to 
intentionally upset the minor children when he picks them 
up for scheduled visitation is a total mis-statement, is 
false and denied. Defendant would never try to intentionally 
upset her own children. 
(i) The statements of Plaintiff in paragraph 5(i) of 
his Motion that Defendant left messages on Plaintiff's 
answering machine, insulting and demeaning Plaintiff's wife 
is denied and untrue. If Plaintiff is referring to Defendant 
repeating the statement made by Roz to Defendant, this was 
only a comment to Plaintiff regarding such statement and 
how other people, who knew Lee, his wife, perceived her. 
Defendant did leave a request and warning on Plaintiff's 
answering machine to the effect that he and his wife were 
not to talk to Kira about custody and to discontinue upsetting 
and traumatizing the children by forcing Erika to call Lee 
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mom. That if the Plaintiff and his wife persisted in this 
course of conduct, Defendant would have no alternative but to 
contact her attorney in an effort to seek a Restraining 
Order, as stated above. 
7. The statements of Plaintiff, in paragraph 6 of his Motion 
are disputed and denied in that they are without fact, merit or 
basis. The upset and trauma the children have experienced is a 
direct result of Plaintiff and his wife discussing the issues of 
custody with the children and forcing the children to do things 
against their will. 
8. Defendant denies and disputes all of the statements and 
allegations of Plaintiff in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of his Motion on 
the basis of hearsay and supposition on the part of Plaintiff. 
Defendant is unable to admit or deny what Plaintiff believes or 
does not believe. However, the statements of Plaintiff, based on 
his belief, are without factual basis or merit. 
When the children return home from visits with their father 
and his new wife, they are generally irritable and at times moody. 
The children have stated they do not like sharing their father with 
Lee, his wife, all the time. The youngest child came home crying 
and upset from one of the latest visits with her father because he 
and his wife were trying to force her to eat everything on her 
plate and she wasn't hungry. The children have informed Defendant 
that on weekend visits that they have had so far, they are left to 
play with the children across the street most of the afternoon. 
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Plaintifffs new wife, Lee, has never been married before, has 
never had children of her own and apparently has little or no 
parenting skills, evidenced by her attempts to force the youngest 
child to eat when she is not hungry. The children have related to 
Defendant that Lee, Plaintiff's wife,, does not like the word "step-
mom" and has forced the children to call her "mom." Defendant is 
informed that Plaintiff's wife does not approve of the clothing the 
children wear. It is not good enough and not presentable to her 
friends. The last weekend visitation, April 25,1992, Plaintiff's 
wife took the children to Nordstrom's and bought them new clothing 
and then took them and introduced 
them to her friends as "her children" when in fact they are not her 
children. The clothing she purchased for Erika was too tight. 
When Erika returned home, she complained about her pants hurting 
her and started to cry. When her pants were removed, there were 
red rings around her waist, evidencing that the clothing was the 
wrong size and her pants had been too tight, causing her discomfort 
and pain. Also, on the last weekend visitation, April 25, 1992, 
Defendant contacted Plaintiff by phone and informed him that she 
would drive by and pick up the children Sunday afternoon at the 
time he had indicated he would return the children in anticipation 
of her running some errands. Plaintiff refused, stating he did not 
want Defendant to come to the home of his present wife because he 
was afraid there might be a confrontation. Defendant stated she 
did not feel this would occur in that there had been a smooth 
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exchange of the children on Friday afternoon with his wife when the 
children were picked up. Defendant then suggested that she remain 
in the car and Plaintiff bring the children out to the car. 
Plaintiff again refused, stating he did not want to do it that way. 
It was then suggested that the parties meet on mutual ground, at 
Mervyn's at 4:30 P.M. Plaintiff agreed. Defendant stated to 
Plaintiff, "you are still having a power struggle with me. You are 
just going to have to get an emotional divorce, not just a physical 
divorce." Defendant regarded this, as well as his Motion, to be a 
continuation of Plaintiff's power struggle against Defendant in 
that he continues to try and control and dominate Defendant through 
the children, via visitation, payment of alimony and the children's 
school expenses. 
9. Defendant questions the sincerity of Plaintiff in entering 
into his recent marriage. Plaintiff told Defendant, in the 
presence of Kira's therapist, just before he entered into marriage, 
that he did not want to get married. He wanted Defendant to sign 
a statement that the children could visit with him over night in 
the presence of his girlfriend, without the benefit of marriage and 
requested that the therapist be a witness to such statement. 
Defendant indicated that the situation he wanted to create and 
place the children in, in her opinion was immoral, not in the best 
interest of the minor children, and contrary to their religious 
training and principals. Plaintiff became angry. At that time 
Defendant told Plaintiff that he should get married if he wanted to 
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visit with the children on an overnight basis in the presence of 
his girlfriend, who would then be his wife. In a matter of days, 
the Plaintiff remarried. 
Plaintiff told Defendant on another occasion, that he did not 
desire to marry again, he was only doing so because he could not 
afford to pay rent for a separate apartment and because Defendant 
would not let him take the children over night with an unmarried 
woman, his girlfriend, in her house, since it would conflict with 
the morals and values of the children that their Catholic 
upbringing had taught and was teaching them, which Defendant has 
tried to foster and instill in them. 
10. Despite all of the stress that has occurred the past 
winter and spring, related to the divorce, Defendant has maintained 
an over all 3.8 grade average while attending the University and 
was accepted into the School of Education in an extremely 
competitive field of applications (See attachments hereto). 
11. Contrary to the statements of Plaintiff, based on his 
beliefs, Kira's therapist has related to Defendant that Kira seems 
like a very mature girl and other than some depression, 
characterized by crying, and confusion because of the problems 
associated with the divorce, Kira is alright. Erika, the youngest, 
is in kindergarten, knows how to read and do simple math problems. 
Neither child has ever stated to Defendant that they would like to 
see their father more often. 
12. It has been necessary for the Defendant to incur 
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additional cost and expense for attorney's fees in connection with 
this Motion. It is appropriate that the Plaintiff be required to 
pay Defendant's attorney's fees and costs. 
WHEREFORE, Based upon this Reply, Defendant prays that the 
Motion of Plaintiff be dismissed and denied and that she be awarded 
her attorney's fees and such other and further relief as the Court 
deems proper. 
DATED this " day of May, 1992. 
/ 
rtmum E.^f. FAJJKHAtfSER 
Attorney for Defendant 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss. 
Personally appeared before me, MARY E. RANDOLPH, who 
acknowledged to me that she is the Defendant named in the foregoing 
action. That she has read the foregoing Reply to Plaintiff's 
Motion and the matters stated therein are true to her own 
knowledge, except as to matters stated on information and belief 
and as to such matters she believes them to be true. 
MARY E 
Subscril 
^> 
a^pdpj :n to before me this s # 
May, 1 9 9 2 . f/Q My < 
Comrr*£*icn 
Expire* fcav'.1,1392 
LOU J£ANN£ LEFLEfi \l 
243 E^et 400 So., Suae 200 ; | 
3art U * c Ctty, 
UT 94111 
/> £ Of V v 
day of 
NOTARY PEfBLIC ~ ' 
Residing in Salt Lake County. Utah 
My Commission Expires: <T///~/p2--
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed 
to Kellie F. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, 310 South Main 
Street, Suite 1400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this *-?' 
of May, 1992 
day 
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Education Advising Center 
226 Milton Bennion Hall 
University of Utah 
To the Admissions Committee: 
As her professor in two fairly demanding courses in Research Methods (Winter, 
1991) and Community Psychology (Spring, 1991), I highly recommend Ms. Mary E. 
Randolph for admission to the program in elementary teacher education. 
The methods course took a generalist and practical approach to the conduct and 
consumption of social science research. Since 1 am an applied research 
psychologist, most of the illustrations of research design were relevant to 
educational studies (program evaluation, need assessment, survey, 
consultation, etc.). The content of the community psychology course is even 
more relevant to a degree in education (including school-based prevention 
programming and community mental health, stress, coping and social support, 
theories of applied social ecology, self help, citizen participation and 
empowerment, community intervention, etc.). 
Mary received received an A- in Research Methods. The centerpiece of the 
course requirements was the planning and completion of a community-based 
empirical research project in each lab. Mary worked on a valuable and 
well-researched project in conjunction with the Salt Lake Community Services 
Council (CSC) evaluating the Salt Lake Food Bank's free food distribution 
program. Mary was primarily responsible for conducting the pilot survey of 
clients at a food pantry site and for helping to develop the final 
questionnaire for the project. The report from this project was used and 
greatly appreciated by the CSC. 
In the community psychology course, Mary received a strong A grade. This 
course involved an even more ambitious class project: a community needs 
assessment, in which Mary interviewed residents in a low-income neighborhood 
and wrote a section of the final report. She received an A for her 
participation in the project. This project was so successful that it spun off 
an on-going student volunteer service project in that same community to 
follow-up on the needs that were identified. 
She received a perfect (extremely rare) score on her final essay exam and an 
almost perfect score on a critical research article review assignment. 
Finally, on a more personal plane, during the time that Mary was taking these 
two courses she was experiencing a tremendous amount of family-related stress 
in her life. She nevertheless responded with a conscientious and diligent 
commitment to scholastic achievement and to teaching and helping children. 
Again, given her ability to adapt with a positive, good natured personality to 
the difficult and diverse requirements of my courses,}ym% to mention the 
course of life, I recommend Ms .•-Randolph highly, 
/ y /9 
Douglas D. Perkins, PhX.L^^^p^/r'<^y - .
 v^ _x . _ 
Assistant Professor V F - X ^ I ammm*
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 TTHE ™ 
UNIVERSITY 
o^UTAH 
February 20, 1992 
Mary Randolph 
1156 So. Foothill #135 
SLC, UT 84102 
Dear Mary, 
Congratulations on your admission to the Elementary Teacher Education 
Program! 
Over the next year, you will be intensely involved in learning to become 
a teacher. Our hope is that you'll develop an in-depth understanding of 
schooling, teaching, and learning essential to functioning as a professional 
educator. 
To provide a system of support while enrolled, students take the 
professional core courses as members of a cohort group. The cohort 
organization has been adopted to encourage peer support and criticism, enhance 
growth, and provide for continuous evaluation and feedback. It is our belief 
that collaborative work like this will carry over into the schools. 
Because space in each cohort is limited, you must make arrangements to 
meet with the Education Advisor. When you come in, you'll fill-out a program 
planning sheet and discuss which cohort you'll be entering. Please contact 
the Education Advising Center (226 MBH, 581-7789) to set-up an appointment. 
As an admitted student, you're required to maintain certain standards. 
One of these is that your cumulative g.p.a. be no lower than 2.7. 
Additionally, you must obtain a grade of "C" or better in your education 
coursework. For a full description of departmental policies on retention, 
refer to "Retention Policies and Procedures" (available from the EAC). 
If I can be of assistance to you, please let me know. I wish you much 
success in the program. 
Sincerely, 
Andrew Gitlin 
Director, Teacher Certification Programs 
Department of Educational Studies 
AG/sg 
xc: student file 
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UNIVERSITY OF UTAH CHILD AND FAMILY DEVELOPMENT CENTER 
COMPETENCY RATING FORM 
H a m Ra\r>rJo\pV^ 'or: 
I r i t t e n by: V Y P A A P . V P A " r\CM ) \PI i 
>ate: SnT\V \ r i Q\JCl r W W l 
PERSONAL QUALITIES: 
L. Genera l Appearance 
S e l f - c o n f i d e n c e 
P u n c t u a l i t y 
Coopera t ion w i t h s t a f f 
Seeks assessment of s e l f 
C r e a t i v e model f o r c h i l d r e n 
F u n c t i o n s i n d e p e n d e n t l y 
A t t i t u d e 
1 = e x c e l l e n t 
5 = poor A 
8 
1 2 3 4 5 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
s • • • • 
a. Greets or acknowledges the presence of children 
upon arrival 
• • • • 
b. Shows friendliness and affection towards children ^ '—' '—' '—' '—' 
c. Engages in one to one conversations with children 
Km • • • d. Shows pleasure/enjoyment/humor/playfulness by laughing or smiling when interfacing with children 
e. Speaks with a pleasant, distinct we11-modulated 
voice 
9. Familiarity with facility routines 
a. Looks at written plans and/or consulted with 
other staff about schedule and/or procedure 
b* Appears to be aware of the schedule 
• • • • 
• D • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
OMMENTS: 
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Ability to help child interpret, verbalize and deal 
with emotions 
2 3 4 5 
a. Allowed or encouraged children to help peers or p — i i — . .—, , — i ,—. 
help with routine tasks u*D I—II—II—II—I 
b . Thanks children for helping or being thoughtful H • • • • 
c. Encourages children to take turns or share 
B • • • • 
d. Praises/acknowledges children for taking turns or nrpr \—i i—• .—. ,—. 
sharing ' 1^ 1 L_J l_J l_J l_J 
e. Gives children the time to work out problems 
m a • • • 
f. Models appropriate ways to solve interpersonal I*H I—ll—l l—I I—1 
problems I^ J I—I I—I l_J LJ 
g. Encourages children to verbally express needs r—j i—i i—i i—i «—. 
and/or feelings to others ^ '—I I—' '—> '—I 
h. Encourages children to listen to one another H D • • • 
i. Attempts to help peers understand each other r\71 I—II—II—II—l 
intentions L2<J l_J L_J L_J L_J 
Ability to use appropriate guidance techniques 
a. Arranges environment to avoid problems H • • • • 
b. Gives directions or sets limits positively '—I Bfl I—II—II—I 
c. Gives choices a • • • • 
. Ability to assess children in areas of creativity 7^*1 1—11—11—11—1 
and talent KJ U LJ U U 
rWu \AeecXs Ao orocVice proper auidcj/vvce +ejckniaues> 
/aluation of Student's Planned 'Projects 
L. Were all assigned projects completed: Yesx No 
2. Were plans for assignments handed in on time? Yes X No" 
3. Was planning for each project adequate? Yes*T No" 
I. Were projects appropriate for group? Yesx No" 
5. Was student able to hold children's interest? Yes X No" 
5. Was student creative in presentation and/or 
visual aids developed? Y&syC No 
Was student able to relate projects to individual 
children? YesX No 
3. Was student able to adjust to unforeseen incidents? YesvL.No" nnni9' 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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•>RKING WITH CHILDREN: 1 2 3 4 5 
B D D D D Ability to accept and work with individuals 
Ability to work with small groups 
Ability to work with large groups 
Classroom management skills 
a. Sets limits clearly and follows through 
b. Redirects 
c . Encourages independence and s e l f - h e l p s k i l l s l^ fl I—II—II—II—I 
s • • • • 
• H" • • • 
• IS • • • 
• • • • 
d. Is usually positioned to be able to see most r—i i—i i—i i—i i—i 
of the children at one time ">5 '—II—II—II—I 
n a n a e. Often visually scans the entire area 
f. Prevents problems from occurring B • • • • 
g. Responds quickly when misbehavior or problems rcn i—i i—i i—i r—i 
Ability to relate to children 
a. Non-verbal skills 
1) Makes eye contact with children ucl I—II—II—II—I 
i 
2) Matches nonverbal behavior with verbal p--| i—i i—i i—i i — i 
3) Remains calm and reasonable when s e t t i n g f r > n i — i i — i i — i i — i 
l i m i t s or d i s c i p l i n i n g I^ J l_J l_J l_J l_J 
b . Verbal s k i l l s 
1) Encourages language use • • • • 
2) Uses vocabulary appropriate t o the i—i rr^ \—i i—i i—i 
developmental l e v e l of the chi ldren l_l I2S L_l l_J LJ 
3) Introduces new vocabulary in conversat ions ^ i—i i—i i—i i—i 
• n n D 
with children 
4) Speaks with correct grammar 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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LO 
LI 
L2 
1 2 3 4 5 
Ability to implement learning p - , i—i i—i i—• •—• 
a. Adaptability in curriculum «-^J '—' '—' '—' I — ' 
b. Permits exploration 
s n n n • 
c. Stimulates curiosity and creativity 
H • • • • 
1) Asks open-ended questions "^ '—' '—' '—' '—' 
2) Encourages pretend play and imagination ^ '—' '—' '—' '—' 
Ability to relate to parents '—I bw I—II—II—I 
Skill in understanding procedures and policies '—' '—' ^ '—' '—' 
Ability to meet individual needs and differences ^ '—' '—' '—' '—' 
L3. Willingness to participate in pre- and [vj I—II—II—II—I 
post-conference discussion ^ '—' '—' '—' '—' 
L4 . Cooperation in helping other students with their i—i i—i rrpr i—i i—i 
activities LJ l_l j*J l_l LJ 
;OMMENTS: 
bcapjv\ uoorKuna HA "YW- \a_\o. She- OALUOL^S 
puAs -forVV> evVra e9cbr-V. [\ejr \esc\sfv\\vv,\ ctcAiu'Vtes 
OwC&- Some- o^ -VK&- \oe,s»V 31 KAJue. <&uejc s»e.€^w. 
SWe ctaes* i^ee^ \o be^ OXX-<L?U\ c^oudr commxa^ic 
pe/c^ovma/v%c£. O? c o - u^orfce^s^ W~V s K e o£-Ve>K 
-foTae/Vs \? \ jerta\i-L^ -H\^ posiVfuec,, £oYk cure 
\irv\por4cw\A. Oue^cc\l; sKe Uuas a. qooci +eA£k&r 
Q/WZ\ ck\ck a ueAru acocA ^ 6 ^ -
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